632 security in this way than if they had taken the whole matter into their
361 own hands, for the natives naturally go to a great deal of trouble to justify the trust placed in them so as not to lose the privileges thus far granted, as a consequence of some abuse.

641 Like the other natives of Turkestan, the men of Tashkent are also not drafted into military service, in accordance with a special stipulation incidental to the surrender of the town. Besides, the Russians would probably not have required military service from them even in the absence of such a stipulation, for the sedentary population of Turkestan would in any case supply soldiers of only very doubtful worth, and as foot soldiers they would be completely useless.

6. Family Relations.

595 Family relations among the sedentary population of Turkestan, at least according to our concepts, are extremely wretched, and a family life in our sense is completely unthinkable. The Sarts, Tadjiks and sedentary Uzbeks, being Mohammedans, are polygamous, like the Mohammedan nomads. The luxury of several wives can be afforded only by the richer men however, for even among them a 'kalym' /bride-wealth/ must be paid to the parents of the bride, which is usually a specified sum of money. The poorer men are satisfied usually with one or, at the most, two wives. Many are unable to provide themselves with a wife at all because, due to the polygamy of the richer men, the number of single women /193/ in itself is already significantly smaller than that of the men. For this reason there are no old maids in Turkestan, but on the other hand there are that many more involuntary bachelors.

584 The girls are not allowed to marry according to their own judgment, but are given away by their parents without regard to their per-
582 sonal inclinations. They marry very early, sometimes when they are ten, but as a result, when they are twenty they mostly belong among
593 the old women. The wife is completely the slave of her husband. He
562 clothes and feeds her well or badly, depending upon his whim, and without regard to his financial position or his civic rank; he lets some of his wives go about in rags and employs them for the lowest kind of labor, while he clothes others in gold and silks. If the situation for such a neglected wife is, in itself, not an enviable one, it is aggravated by the fact that she must look on while her children have to yield in everything to the children of the favorite wife, and she her-

593 562 [586] self must put up with any treatment from them. Only wives born in the better families can force better treatment from their husbands through their family ties, and in case of mistreatment by their husbands, such wives can by a legal action cause the husbands to *separate from them.* All other wives are exposed without protection to the arbitrary will of their husbands, who may at any time separate from them or take younger wives besides them if the older ones no longer please them, all this without giving reasons.

The most important circumstance which makes all public life unbearably monotonous and boring in Turkestan towns, and prevents the rise of a real social and family life, is the absolute seclusion, worse than in a cloister, of the women from the world of men. On the street the women must either not appear at all, or else they must be so heavily veiled that nothing at all can be seen of their figures. At home, however, they must live in a special section which can never be entered by any man other than their husbands and children. The groom is not allowed [584] to see his bride even once before the wedding, and even during the marriage ceremony the bride and groom are in two different places. Thus the men must, unfortunately, depend on the judgments of their female relatives or on professional matchmakers for their choice of wives. Substitutions, such as those by which the patriarch Joseph was tricked by his father-in-law Laban are therefore easily made. At best the wives can live the rest of their lives communicating only with their brothers and parents in addition to their husbands, while all other men are for them as /194/ good as nonexistent. The women cannot take part in any public festivity, not even in family celbrations or receptions of guests in their own houses. A more joyless existence than that of the native wives in the towns of Central Asia can scarcely be imagined. (1)

[839] 1. I will note here that in Turkestan the institution of eunuchs is unknown. Even the harems of the khans there are no eunuchs.

On the whole, however, the life of the men too is in no way enviable as a result of the sharp separation of the sexes. A man without family never meets a female face to face at all, all his life, and is left exclusively to associate with men. The result of these unnatural conditions is an unbelievable moral depravity and a really horrifying increase of all possible unnatural vices.

The married men, too, have relatively little contact with their

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to play an important role in the life of the Central Asian Muslims of the Soviet Union.

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Let us now turn to other Islamic customs and practices. Circumcision appears from the interviews to be almost universally observed by Central Asian Muslims. One of the reasons for its prevalence is its tolerance by the regime, caused by the fact that this practice requires neither abstention from work nor the transfer of personal allegiance from the state to the religion, and in fact may be justified by hygenic reasons. It is performed by mendicant "specialists," who visit villages and towns, or by anyone else skilled in the use of appropriate instruments, such as local barbers. Communist Party members and other persons in positions of responsibility who may be incriminated in the eyes of the regime by observing this practice, send their children to relatives away from home, where they can be circumcised without the knowledge of the local authorities. Circumcision seems to have lost its festive character, and is carried out so as to attract the minimum attention. Its prevalence among all layers of Muslim society, including Communist Party members, has been attested to by every one of the refugees interviewed.

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The religious ceremonies attending births, weddings, and burials require the presence of religiously trained figures such as the mullahs, and it is the great shortage of such persons which more than any factor deprives them of their religious character. The vast majority of mullahs and other Muslim leaders disappeared during the terror of 1928–32. Careful questioning of refugees revealed that in some villages and towns mullahs did remain all throughout the 1930's. These "hidden mullahs" earned their livelihood as ordinary workers (e.g., kolkhoz laborers, night watchmen, etc.) and often as janitors in mosques and other religious buildings, but when the occasion arose could also conduct religious ceremonies if the latter were organized by trusted friends and within a closed family circle. Almost every one of the refugees interviewed remembered either knowing of such a clandestine mullah or of having heard of one. But they are few and live under the perpetual threat of exposure and arrest; hence, they cannot make a great impression on the religious life of their communities. Where there is need for persons with religious training, the natives are far more likely to use the services of an elderly layman from their own midst than risk engaging a person who is difficult to locate and may involve them in trouble with the authorities.

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As a consequence of the disappearance of the religious leaders, births, weddings, and burials appear to have largely lost their religious complexion and become transformed into occasions for mere family gatherings. The entire institution of betrothal — which will be described at greater length below — conforms closely to secular local traditions, but is no longer accompanied by religious ceremonies. Occasionally, refugees indicate; after

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the Russian; but instead of constituting the substance of ethnic identification, as it did before the Revolution, today it forms merely one of its many attributes.

CUSTOMS

Although most national customs of the Central Asian Turks are in one way or another connected with Islam, they are by origin and function sufficiently distinct from it to be treated independently, the more so that they are affected differently by Soviet policies: whereas Communism is openly hostile to religion, it either tolerates customs or attempts to take them over for its own purposes.

National customs have fared much better under Soviet rule than religious practices, in part as a result of this tolerant attitude of the regime and in part because they can be better reconciled with the spirit of Westernization. While Islam has suffered a serious decline, national customs have either remained intact or undergone a transformation which has modified somewhat their outward manifestations without diminishing their hold on the population. In regard to customs, the following seems to be the general rule: the natives abandon or modify those customs which are utterly incompatible with the improvement of living standards, but they cling tenaciously to the traditions which either do not interfere with material progress or can be modified to serve it. Where abandonment or adjustment is necessary, the natives often prefer to adopt the customs of their more advanced Muslim neighbors than those of the Russians or other Europeans.

This pattern emerges clearly in the institution of marriage, which can be analyzed in its three main aspects: the method whereby the marriage is arranged; the formalities connected with the engagement; and the wedding ceremony.

Traditionally, in Muslim communities of Central Asia marriages were arranged not by the couples concerned, but by their parents. Engagements were frequently made when the prospective bride and bridegroom were still in their childhood, and occasionally even before they were born. This custom was in keeping with the elevated position of the father in the Muslim family, and with the seclusion of women in the urban and rural communities of Turkestan; among the nomadic Turks, the high bride price (*kalym*) was a further factor inhibiting marriage outside parental authority.

Inasmuch as this practice runs contrary to the breaking up of family control and the emancipation of women implicit in Westernization, it is being abandoned. Everywhere, and particularly in the urban centers, the youth is becoming less and less dependent on the family, and, with the active encouragement of the regime, frees itself from its control. Coeducational schools, participation in sports, the growing practice of social